How Confusing Are Medicare HMO Benefits?
In examining the marketing materials disseminated by six large HMOs in Los Angeles County, California, and Cook County, Illinois (Chicago), plan benefits, as described, were found to be very confusing. Three sources of potential confusion are analyzed. The first concerns plans' use of different wording to describe the same benefit. The second results from the failure of some plans to list all the benefits that are offered. Both of these issues can be addressed by standardizing the format and wording of the information provided to beneficiaries rather than standardizing the actual benefits. The third source of confusion lies in the benefits themselves; prescription drugs were found to be particularly confusing.
Pros and Cons of Standardizing Benefits
vi Standardizing Medicare HMO benefits would not only make plan comparisons easier for consumers, it would potentially encourage competition on cost and quality. Without standardization, plans' benefit packages could become even more confusing if, as seems likely, the availability of point-of-service offerings increases.
The major argument against standardization is that it would reduce both consumer choice and the ability of HMOs to innovate in designing their benefits. In addition, standardization would also shift the process of benefit package design from the marketplace to the political arena.
Alternatives to Full Standardization of Benefits
If the Medigap model were followed, the federal government would designate a set of standardized HMO benefit packages that would be the only ones that could be offered. Less far-reaching reform options include:
• Standardizing the format and wording of benefit descriptions in marketing materials.
• Standardizing within certain categories of benefits, such as copayments for Medicarecovered services, prescription drugs, and dental, vision, and hearing benefits.
• Establishing a minimum benefit package while allowing HMOs to market more comprehensive benefits. The minimum benefit package could include prescription drugs in order to prevent health plans from dropping drug coverage for enrollees who may not be healthy enough to qualify for a Medigap plan that covers drugs.
• Adopting a "core-plus-rider" approach, in which a minimum level of supplemental benefits is established, with a series of standardized riders that can be purchased individually.
Discussion
The authors' view is that standardizing the format and wording of benefits in plan marketing materials would significantly improve comparability. Although some level of standardization of the benefits themselves would also be appropriate, steps would have to be taken to avoid stifling plans' creativity in designing benefit packages. For the near future, the authors recommend that only a limited number of benefit package features be standardized. For example, health plans could be required to allow physicians the discretion to prescribe up to a 90-day supply of drugs; to state any benefit limits on an annual basis (rather than, say, a quarterly basis); and to use a standardized method of calculating when these limits have been reached. vii An incremental approach permits an assessment of standardization efforts before undertaking further expansion. In this way, the unintended consequences that may be inherent in complete and immediate standardization of benefits can hopefully be avoided.
INTRODUCTION
Some 6 million Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled under capitated arrangements in HMOs. In March 1998, 72 percent of these enrollees had a choice of more than one HMO, and 39 percent had access to five or more. 1 The differences in premiums charged and benefits and health care delivery systems offered by these plans is creating difficulty for beneficiaries who are trying to make an informed choice. Currently, HMOs have wide latitude in benefit package design as long as Medicare benefits are included.
With Medigap policies-private insurance that pays benefits beyond those included in the standard Medicare program-the situation is different. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA '90) required that, effective July 31, 1992, the only Medigap policies which could be sold were the 10 standardized packages designed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).
2 In addition, some large employers who offer employees a choice of multiple plans have specified the benefit packages for the health plans with which they contract in order to promote comparability.
In addressing whether Medicare HMO benefits should similarly be standardized, this paper draws on comparisons of benefit packages offered by health plans in Los Angeles and Chicago and interviews with key government officials, health plan representatives, large employers, and consumer groups. It was informed by a one-day meeting in November 1998, funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, of persons who are particularly knowledgeable about HMO and benefits standardization issues. That meeting was jointly convened under the auspices of Health Affairs and George Washington University's Health Insurance Reform Project, which is also funded by the Foundation. Participants included health plan representatives, the federal government, state regulators, consumer groups, and the academic community. (See Appendix A for a listing of meeting participants.)
The report that follows will review the experience of Medigap standardization and discuss the relevance of that experience for HMOs; analyze selected benefit offerings for Los Angeles and Chicago health plans; present the advantages and disadvantages of standardization; and discuss alternatives to the OBRA '90 approach to Medigap standardization. 2 Exceptions were made for three states-Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin-that had standardized Medigap offerings prior to 1990. In addition, carriers could continue to offer old (nonstandardized) policies to persons already covered prior to the implementation of OBRA '90. Also, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 allowed insurers to offer selected plans with a high deductible-$1,500 in 1998 and 1999, with adjustments to be made in subsequent years for rises in the consumer price index. Finally, standardization does not apply to retiree benefits, that is, employer-provided benefits that supplement Medicare.
MEDIGAP REFORM: WHAT IS IT, HAS IT SUCCEEDED, AND IS IT APPLICABLE TO HMOS?
Background of the Medigap Reform Legislation OBRA '90 dramatically changed the rules regarding the sale of Medigap policies. The cornerstone of the Medigap reform provisions was the requirement that benefits be standardized in order to lessen confusion among consumers caused by the disparate benefit packages that were then being sold. Other provisions included:
• increasing the minimum loss ratio-the ratio of benefit payments to premiums-for individual policies from 60 to 65 percent; 3
• limiting agent commissions for the first year of coverage to reduce the incentive to "churn," that is, to switch beneficiaries' coverage in order to earn additional commissions;
• instituting severe penalties for agents and insurers who knowingly sell duplicate coverage;
• requiring that insurers hold a six-month open enrollment period when beneficiaries age 65 or older first enroll in Part B of the Medicare program; and
• limiting preexisting condition exclusions to the first six months of coverage. During the deliberations leading to the enactment of the 1990 Medigap reforms, no consideration was given to standardizing the benefit offerings of HMOs. HMO and Medigap regulations also differ with regard to open enrollment, preexisting condition exclusions, and premium-setting practices. In each case, HMOs are more tightly regulated than Medigap plans.
With regard to open enrollment, Medigap carriers are allowed to medically screen and may deny coverage, except during the six-month open enrollment period and under other limited circumstances set forth in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA '97), such as being enrolled in an HMO that terminates its Medicare contract. HMOs, in contrast, are never allowed to reject an applicant because of his or her health status.
5 Also, HMOs are never allowed to exclude coverage of preexisting conditions, whereas Medigap policies may do so for up to six months if the applicant lacked private health insurance during the prior six months. Finally, with regard to premium-setting practices, HMOs must "community rate"-charge the same premium to all enrollees. Medigap carriers, on the other hand, are allowed to relate premiums to the enrollee's age. Another measure of the reforms' impact is national loss ratio data, which all states report to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). If standardization enhances price competition-an objective of the 1990 legislation-one would expect that a higher proportion of the premium dollar would be paid in benefits rather than retained for administration and profit. Consumers benefit from higher loss ratios, whereas health plans strive to keep them low to bolster profitability.
Impact of the Medigap Reforms
Though ambiguous, the national loss ratio data support, if only minimally, the hypothesis that standardization results in higher loss ratios (Exhibit 1). In the four years preceding the introduction of standardization , loss ratios nationally averaged 81.6 percent; the average loss ratio for 1994-96 was 83.2 percent. To be sure, this difference is small. However, the proportion retained for administration and profit decreased fairly substantially from 18.4 percent to 16.8 percent-a decline of 8.7 percent. 9 The loss ratio for 1992 is ignored because it was a transitional year in which states were required to implement the federally defined standardization requirements. Disregarding 1993 seems reasonable as well: it was an atypical year in that Medigap carriers faced greater risk from having to set premiums for benefit packages that they had not previously offered. Nevertheless, these data should be interpreted with caution, as health insurance pricing is generally thought to be subject to underwriting cycles of several years' duration. In addition, many carriers that previously did not vary premiums by age, or based them on the enrollee's age at the time of enrollment (the "issue age"), switched to basing them on "attained age," or the enrollee's age at any given time. With issue age policies, carriers expect to make money on younger enrollees and incur losses on older ones, a loss against which they may feel a need to keep a reserve. However, the need for reserves to protect against losses for this specific reason is obviated when plans shift from issue to attained age.
Also, some people argue that HMOs have benefited from more favorable than expected risk selection and/or more rapid enrollment, leaving the Medigap pool with the sicker, more expensive enrollees. If true, loss ratios would have risen temporarily in a manner unrelated to whether or not standardization has enhanced price competition. This argument, however, is unpersuasive: insurers would have to consistently underestimate any effect of beneficiaries' switching from Medigap to HMO coverage.
Finally, the increase in the minimum loss ratio for individual policies could have had an impact. However, it would have been a small one, since most policies were significantly above the minimum.
Differences Between HMO and Medigap Coverage
Applying the experience of the 1990 Medigap reforms to HMOs can be problematic. First, the Medicare HMO market may be less mature than the Medigap market, which has a history that dates back to the implementation of Medicare in 1966. Second, HMO benefit and premium levels exhibit greater geographic variation than Medigap policies, reflecting differences in county-based Medicare payment levels for HMOs.
10 For example, in some market areas HMOs offer generous drug coverage as part of basic benefits, while in others they do not. This wider variation exists because HMOs with capitation contracts are financially liable for all Medicare benefits, not just the supplementary portion, as is the case with Medigap coverage.
Third, consumers select Medigap policies mainly on the basis of premiums, benefits, and the services, whereas enrolling in an HMO also entails accepting the health plan's delivery system. HMO plans differ in their network composition, processes for determining medical necessity, ease of access to specialist care, drug formulary composition, and quality assurance mechanisms-none of which easily lend themselves to standardization.
Fourth, HMO benefits change frequently in response to changes in local market conditions and federal policy, including Medicare payment levels. Some argue that standardization would hinder responses to these changes, particularly when most benefits would not normally be changed in small increments. For example, a plan would be loath to change its coverage for skilled nursing facility benefits beyond those covered by Medicare from 50 to 48 days a year. On the other hand, premium levels could be adjusted in small increments, provided a premium is charged.
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HOW CONFUSING ARE MEDICARE HMO BENEFITS?
To answer this question, the study examined plans in two counties with high Medicare HMO market penetration: Los Angeles County, California, and Cook County, Illinois (Chicago). Since the only health plans available to beneficiaries are those that serve the area in which they reside, plan benefits were compared only within each market. The three plans with the highest market penetration within each county were identified through the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) web page, and their marketing packages were obtained from the health plans. In comparing benefits, every attempt was made to be accurate; however, for this study, reflecting the information that consumers actually have when choosing plans was the most important consideration. Thus, when the details of a plan's benefits were unclear-which was true in several instances-no attempt was made to verify the information with the health plan.
Three sources of potential confusion exist. The first occurs when health plans employ different wording to describe the same benefit; for example, a benefit covered without a costsharing requirement might be described by one plan as being "covered in full" and by another as having "no charge." Exhibit 2 illustrates some of the differences identified for the three Los Angeles plans. The second source of confusion lies in the failure of some plans to list all the benefits offered, particularly Medicare benefits that plans are required to cover. An enrollee who is not aware that a benefit exists may not request it. The marketing materials for Kaiser Permanente in Los Angeles, for instance, do not specify that pap smears or colorectal cancer screening are covered. They also state that chiropractic services are excluded and make no mention of covering manual manipulation of the spine. United HealthCare of Illinois also fails to mention that it covers physical therapy, occupational therapy, second opinions, and preventive services such as mammography and influenza vaccinations. The third source of confusion lies in the benefits themselves. Not only are there numerous differences among plans' individual benefits, but multiple combinations of features are offered. Appendixes B and C compare the benefits provided by the three largest plans in Los Angeles and Chicago. In preparing them, the wording from the health plans' marketing materials was changed to make the benefit descriptions as consistent as possible with each other in order to illustrate true differences in benefits rather than differences in wording. The objective in so doing was to determine whether standardizing the presentations eliminated most of the confusion. Confusion arises not only from differences among health plans in the individual benefits they offer but also from the large number of combinations of features from which beneficiaries must choose.
Exhibit 2 Examples of Wording Differences Among HMOs in Los Angeles
The greatest difficulty consumers face is in comparing benefits that Medicare does not cover, such as prescription drugs, dental care, hearing tests and aids, and vision care. In Los Angeles, for example, PacifiCare's prescription drug benefits are unlimited; Kaiser has an annual limit of $2,000; and CareAmerica has no limit on generics but imposes a limit on brandname drugs of $900 per quarter.
Copayments may also vary depending on whether a drug is brand-name or generic, if it is obtained through mail order, and what the maximum supply is that can be prescribed without generating a new copayment. To illustrate the latter, the maximum supply allowed per fill for drugs dispensed through a retail pharmacy among the six HMOs studied is 30, 31, 90, or 100 days. Two HMOs did not state limits on drugs obtained through a retail pharmacy, although they undoubtedly impose them. Five of the plans allow a 90-day supply for mail-order drugs (Kaiser's limit is 100 days); however, the two plans that did not state a maximum for drugs dispensed through a pharmacy do subject the 90-day supply to a double copayment.
Copayments and upper limits also vary for a variety of Medicare-covered services. For example, PacifiCare charges $20 for in-area emergency services, Kaiser charges $3, and CareAmerica charges the lesser of $25 or 20 percent of charges. PacifiCare and CareAmerica waive the copayment if the beneficiary is admitted to the hospital; Kaiser apparently does not do so, although the marketing materials are unclear.
Except for CareAmerica in Los Angeles, which offers vision coverage, none of the six plans examined offer significant point-of-service benefits, which pay for services rendered by non-network providers. However, such benefits are offered by plans in other markets and are a growing phenomenon. Plans differ in their deductibles, coinsurance, and limits on these benefits, which typically range from $2,000 to $50,000 per year. Some plans cover only services that are provided outside the service area (often referred to as a "travel benefit"); since urgent out-of-area services are always covered, confusion is likely regarding the scope of this benefit. In addition, some plans limit the nature of services that are offered-for example, by not covering certain hospital services or occupational or speech therapy-and some require pre-certification for services delivered by non-network providers.
For the Los Angeles health plans, the information contained in the marketing materials was also compared with the Medicare Compare web site, which lets beneficiaries compare plans' benefit packages. Significant discrepancies were discovered:
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• PacifiCare's marketing materials state that only one benefit plan is offered-a fact confirmed by calling the health plan-but Medicare Compare reports that two plans are offered. Also, inconsistencies exist in the descriptions of the cost-sharing and benefit limit structure for prescription drugs, preventive dental services, and chiropractic care.
• CareAmerica's marketing materials list only one available benefit plan, while Medicare
Compare reports, erroneously, that four plans are offered that differ in premium and number of chiropractic visits allowed per year. For physical exams, CareAmerica specifies a $3 copayment, whereas Medicare Compare states only that enrollees are covered for one physical exam per year-thus implying that no copayment is charged, since copayments are specified for other benefit categories.
(See Appendix D for a more extensive list for the three Los Angeles health plans included in this study.)
THE STANDARDIZATION DEBATE Arguments for Standardizing Benefits
The major argument in favor of standardizing HMO benefits is that doing so would make it easier for consumers to compare plans. As with Medigap, standardization would reduce consumer choice because there would be fewer benefit package on the market. This choice becomes less meaningful, however, if the choices are confusing. Standardization also has the potential to enhance price competition. In addition, several respondents felt that the greater comparability of benefits achieved through standardization would allow prospective enrollees to focus on delivery system differences and would also enhance competition based on quality. Finally, some interviewees felt that the HMO Medicare market was mature enough to withstand standardizing at least some of the benefits, such as prescription drugs, but not long-term care. However, they also saw the need for a defined process to reassess the standardized benefit packages every few years in light of changed market conditions. Many of the consumer representatives interviewed for this study believe that ensuring some standard level of prescription drug coverage is particularly important, even it entails higher premiums. They argue that: (1) managing care is difficult if prescription drugs are not covered; (2) where health plans drop coverage of drugs, enrollees may not have the opportunity to revert to a Medigap policy that does; and (3) covering prescription drugs as part of basic benefits reduces the potential for the HMO to gain from favorable risk selection.
Some consumer representatives felt that HMOs are allowed to market benefits that may be accurately portrayed but are in fact illusory. For example, the extent to which the price of "discounted" dental services is below the amount charged is generally not stated in brochures. Furthermore, dentists who agree to the discounts may do so only as a loss-leader to undiscounted services. These interviewees questioned whether such a benefit constituted anything more than meaningless product differentiation.
The advent of point-of-service, if it is in fact a trend, will make comparison of benefits even more complicated. Developing standardized packages for these benefits could prove particularly challenging.
Arguments Against Standardizing Benefits
One argument against standardizing HMO benefit packages for Medicare beneficiaries is that choosing a health care delivery system-which selecting an HMO entails-is more important than the choosing the benefit package itself. Medigap policies, by contrast, differ mainly in their benefits, price, and carrier-provided service. By this argument, standardizing benefits solves at most a minor problem.
Another argument against standardization is that it would reduce the ability of HMOs to innovate in designing their benefit packages. Although this was also a principal objection to standardizing Medigap policies, the level of HMO experimentation in designing benefits for the Medicare population is greater than in the years preceding the OBRA '90 reforms. Furthermore, this period of creative ferment is likely to continue for several years as HMOs respond to the far-reaching changes in the BBA '97 and the implementing regulations.
An example of health plan innovation that might be hindered by standardization concerns copayment levels. Traditionally, health plans have had set copayment levels for physician visits, differing only according to whether the provider was a primary care physician (PCP) or a specialist to whom the patient was referred. Some health plans, however, while requiring beneficiaries to visit doctors only within the network, charge lower copayments for specialist visits when the patient has first obtained a referral from his or her PCP. This hybrid of a PCP gatekeeper model and an open-access model could be attractive to many consumers. Indeed, choosing the type of health care delivery system, which selecting an HMO entails, may in general be more important than choosing the benefit package itself. Standardizing benefits, as some contend, solves at most a minor problem.
Health plans may also have less flexibility to react to changes in the Medicare program itself. The fee-for-service Medicare program undergoes changes regularly in terms of benefits as well as coverage and reimbursement rules. Although these changes are in theory reflected in HMO payment levels and thus would require few adjustments, HMOs may not consider the payment change to have been accurately calculated. Medigap policies also have to adjust to changes in Medicare, but the effects are more dramatic for HMOs, which are at risk for all benefits-not just the supplemental portion.
Another argument against standardization is that it may reduce the ability of plans to respond to geographic variation in benefit levels, which to a substantial degree mirror variations in the county-based monthly capitation amounts that plans receive from Medicare. The level of benefits in a standardized package might be acceptable to consumers in some markets but not in others. On the other hand, the 10 standardized Medigap packages do vary in the level of benefits they provide. The least comprehensive package, Plan A, covers mostly Medicare coinsurance and not, for example, the Part A or Part B deductibles or prescription drugs. The most comprehensive one, Plan J, pays deductibles, offers limited prescription drug coverage, and covers SNF coinsurance, foreign travel, and selected preventive and in-home benefits not paid for by Medicare. Average premiums for Plan J are more than three times those of Plan A.
13 HMOs, however, need not offer more than one plan and thus can elect to offer benefits that are within the range of what is attractive in the local market place.
14 Finally, some of those interviewed expressed concern that standardization would shift the process of benefit package design from the marketplace to the political arena. The 1990 Medigap reform legislation instituted a process that is instructive in this regard. 15 The NAIC was given nine months to formulate as many as 10 standard policies-an unusual role for a private body, albeit one that represents state regulators. (Had it failed, HCFA would have assumed this role.) Beyond that, Congress offered little guidance regarding the content of the policies or the process for developing them. To conduct this task, the NAIC established an advisory working group composed of six insurance and six consumer representatives, which became the focal point for designing the policies.
The process is widely regarded as having worked well. Credit is given to the consensus-building roles of the two co-chairs, one an insurance industry representative and the other a consumer representative; the superior technical work of the NAIC staff; and the willingness of individual members of the work group to reconcile their differences. Some benefit issues were hotly debated, such as ones related to the inclusion of prescription drugs and preventive services, and the process was not devoid of politics. Nevertheless, agreement was reached in the end, and standardization was successfully implemented.
ALTERNATIVES TO FULL STANDARDIZATION OF BENEFITS
If the Medigap model of benefit standardization were followed, the federal government would designate a set of standardized benefit packages that would be the only ones that could be sold. 16 Retiree health plans would be exempt, and health plans would decide which of the standardized packages to market. However, options that are less far-reaching than this exist. They include:
13 McCormack et al., 1996, p. 169. 14 This provision would be different from the Medigap requirement that HMOs offer, at a minimum, the basic Medicare Plan A benefits package, with the marketing of any of the other nine standard plans optional. 15 For a detailed description of the process, see Fox et al. 16 OBRA '90 allows states to approve the sale of "innovative benefits" that would represent variations on the 10 standardized Medigap packages, and a similar provision would be adopted for HMOs. However, few states have approved the offering of innovative benefits.
Standardizing the format and wording of HMOs' marketing materials.
17 Under this approach, HCFA would promulgate a standard format and guidelines for proper wording of benefit descriptions in health plan literature. For example, if a service is covered in full, the standardized wording might be "covered in full" rather than "no charge." HCFA public information campaigns would also reflect the standardized format and wording.
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2. Standardizing only within major categories of benefits. Standardization could be limited to a few areas, such as copayments for Medicare-covered services and prescription drugs. For prescription drugs, health plans might be required to set copayments at either $5 or $10 and to state benefit limits on an annual basis only (at present, limits can be annual, quarterly, or monthly). The method for determining when benefit limits have been reached could be standardized as well. Currently, health plans differ in how they count benefit payments for this purpose: calculations may reflect the full retail price, the payment rate that plans negotiate with pharmacies, or the price at which pharmacies acquire the prescription drug. As a result, what appear to consumers as identical limits are, in fact, different. In addition, the maximum supply of prescription drugs allowed before a new copayment is charged could be set at 90 days or some other agreed-upon period. Within these constraints, plans would be free to mix and match benefits.
3. Establishing a minimum benefit package. With this option-which was in effect for Medigap prior to the OBRA '90 reforms-HMOs would be allowed to sell any benefit package as long as it includes certain standard benefits. However, a minimum benefit package does little to reduce beneficiary confusion, since all carriers include additional benefits in their offerings.
4. The core-plus-rider approach. This entails setting a minimum level of supplemental benefits plus allowing a series of riders to be sold individually. Such an approach permits enrollees to tailor their benefit package to their needs. The core plan might involve significant copayments, but the enrollee would be able to purchase separate riders for (1) lower copayments for physician services, (2) lower copayments for hospital and other institutional services, and (3) prescription drugs. A major concern with the core-plus-rider approach is that it can lead to biased selection, particularly for prescription drug coverage, which may be selected principally by individuals with chronic conditions requiring ongoing medication. 19 However, Wisconsin's Medigap core-plus-rider plan, which was adopted in 1989 and includes a freestanding prescription drug rider, has apparently worked well over the years.
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DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the November 1998 health insurance reform meeting that informed this paper was never intended to reach a consensus, there was agreement on many issues. 21 In general, participants regarded the standardization approach adopted by OBRA '90 for Medigap insurance policies as overly rigid for HMOs given the current high level of innovation in benefit design. Participants also agreed that the nature and scope of the benefits offered by individual health plans were difficult to understand from reading plans' marketing materials. Standardizing the wording and format of benefit descriptions, it was felt, would facilitate comparisons for potential and current enrollees. Meanwhile, health plan representatives agreed that regulations governing the information provided to Medicare beneficiaries should be exclusively a HCFA responsibility and that states should be precluded from issuing contradictory requirements.
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A greater divergence of views existed with regard to whether any benefit standardization was appropriate. Of particular concern to several meeting attendees who opposed standardizing benefits was the potential for stifling innovation in copayment structure and other areas. These individuals felt that although the many benefit variations resulting from ongoing innovation may have contributed to consumers' confusion, they are nonetheless part of an adaptive process whereby health plans attempt to control costs while still offering features that will be attractive to consumers.
Some participants also suggested that the distinction between standardizing the presentation of benefits and standardizing the benefits themselves was not as clear-cut as might appear. For example, a benefit offered by one plan that appears to be identical to a benefit offered by another plan-based on the information provided to consumers by the two plansmay in fact not be, because of differences in how the HMOs count expenses toward the benefit limit. Therefore, any meaningful requirement to standardize the presentation of benefits in health plan literature would potentially have to dictate the manner in which plans calculate 19 McCormack et al. present evidence that the three standardized Medigap policies (Plans H, I, and J) do, in fact, face adverse risk selection. 20 On the other hand, McCormack et al. found significant evidence of adverse risk selection in the three standardized plans (H, I, and J) that cover prescription drugs. Wisconsin is one of three states that is exempt from the federal standardization requirements because it had a program in place at the time 1990 legislation was enacted. 21 See the introduction to this paper for background on the meeting. 22 HCFA representatives said that activity was already underway to standardize wording and format.
benefit limits. Such a requirement could be viewed as restricting plans' ability to structure the benefits they offer.
Among those favoring standardization, two approaches were advanced, which are not mutually exclusive. The first is to establish a minimum benefit package that would be broader than the current requirement to cover standard Medicare benefits. The second is to standardize a limited number of benefit package features, including particularly confusing ones such as prescription drug coverage; for example, a standard might be set for the maximum-day supply allowed. In addition, the sentiment among consumer representatives was to prohibit benefits whose actual value they doubted. They cited as an example "discounted" dental and other services that in reality offer only minimal real savings to patients and are used primarily as a loss-leader to attract patients.
The authors believe that some minimal level of benefit standardization, in addition to standardization in plans' presentation of benefit information in their marketing materials, would be appropriate. However, concern over stifling HMOs' creativity in designing benefits, combined with reluctance to impose too much additional regulatory burden on health plans at this time, leads us to recommend that only a limited number of benefit package features be standardized. A good place to start would be to require that physicians be given the discretion to prescribe up to a 90-day supply of drugs, that any benefit package dollar limit be annual, and that the method used by HMOs to calculate when a particular benefit limit has been reached be standardized.
Finally, several meeting participants argued that any standardization runs the risk of being a slippery slope to comprehensive interventions that could end up restricting productive innovation. The authors believe, on the contrary, that consumer confusion will remain a major problem without some level of benefit standardization. By starting out modestly, the results of standardization can be assessed before further expansion is undertaken. In this way, the unintended consequences that could result from a comprehensive standardization program can hopefully be avoided. Brand-name drugs $15 copayment for 30-day prescription. $7 copayment for 100-day supply. $12 copayment for 31-day supply. Generic drugs $5 copayment for 30-day prescription. $7 copayment for 100-day supply. $7 copayment for 31-day supply. Mail-order $30 copayment per 90-day formulary prescription for brand-name drugs; $10 copayment for 90-day prescription for generic.
APPENDIX B BENEFITS COMPARISON FOR LOS ANGELES LOS ANGELES COUNTY
$7 copayment for 100-day supply. $18 copayment for 90-day brand-name supply. $12 copayment for 90-day generic supply. Medicare-approved outpatient drugs
Immunosuppresive drugs covered at 80% within the first 36 months following a Medicare-approved organ transplant; thereafter coverage is 50% of charges.
Injectable drugs for osteoporosis covered in full for post-menopausal homebound women under a doctor's supervision.
Self-administered Erythropoietin and chemotherapy drugs covered in full.
Not specified.
Same as Medicare.
Immunosuppresive drugs covered at 80% following a Medicare-approved organ transplant.
(note: benefits not subject to $900 quarterly limit for brand-name drugs)
APPENDIX C BENEFITS COMPARISON FOR CHICAGO
Paid in full (3-day hospital stay may be waived). Paid in full. Not specified. Not specified. Paid in full (when copayment met for office visit).
Paid in full (when copayment met for office visit).
X-RAY SERVICES
$10 copayment. Paid in full. Not specified. Not specified. $5 copayment. Paid in full. Half of nonmember rates for other immunizations. 
